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I The Puzzle. Motivation
This paper presents an analysis of some of the root causes for persisting poor public service delivery in the Dominican Republic, by looking at the behavior of the middle class in the Dominican Republic, characterized by opting for private services and presenting low-intensity engagement in collective action demands. This background paper is a contribution to the LCR
Flagship Report 2012: Socio-Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Middle Class in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The middle class is alleged to support economic development and good governance by organizing demand for public goods and government accountability, which could lead to an enhanced welfare state, and thus reduced inequality and poverty. In the Dominican Republic, however, the middle class has not frequently participated in collective actions and demands for public accountability, and the quality of public services remains poor.
The aim of this paper is to provide a plausible (but perhaps not definite) explanation for this puzzle, as well as to understand what interdependences within the Dominican middle class could motivate collective arrangements and citizen demand for public accountability. Departing from the theoretical framework for service delivery presented in the World Development Report (2004), we focus in analyzing the relation between the citizens and the state, and, concretely, in the behavior of the Dominican middle class regarding public goods, their institutional perception and their collective engagement.
We find that the Dominican middle class is different from that of developed nations, as it is more vulnerable to poverty and it has resorted to individualized solutions to substitute faulty public goods. Examples of this "adaptive behavior" include the heavy reliance on domestic generation of electricity, the digging of wells to get running water at home, the use of private companies to report car accidents (instead of doing it at the police station), and the use of private services for education and health -these last two also common in other countries of the region. Additionally, the middle class seems to be skeptical and presents low levels of trust in public institutions.
[3] We will argue that low levels of institutional trust and the mentioned individualization of services can partly explain low collective action engagement in the DR, which results in weak accountability and persistent low-quality public goods. In a limited access order context, low levels of trust in public institutions combined with private solutions may undermine collective action engagement, as citizens feel that their efforts will yield little results and a poor response from decision makers and policy implementers.
Enhancing transparency and accountability in public sector service delivery, building capacity at the civil society and constructing bridges between the middle and high class and the poorer are some of the policy actions that should be prioritized to enhance the linkages between citizens and the state and, ultimately, to improve public goods.
The paper is divided as follows; section II presents three sector cases to analyze the response to deficient public goods in the different socioeconomic strata and, especially, within the middle class. Section III explains observed trends and behavior by introducing the paper's theoretical framework and drawing opinion surveys to describe social capital, civil society, institutional trust and collective action in the Dominican Republic. Section IV draws policy implications. Section V concludes.
[4]
II Lack of quality in public goods and individualized solutions to collective problems in the middle class
In this section we illustrate some of the behavioral patterns of the middle and upper classes in the Dominican Republic 1 , such as an observed tendency to adopt individual solutions to solve collective problems. We draw from household surveys to illustrate to the propensity of using private services (health, electricity, transportation) by citizens of different socioeconomic strata.
Besley and Coate (1991) argue that schemes for universal provision of public goods (education, health, etc.) can redistribute income from the rich to the poor. They develop a discrete choice model where some individuals can afford to consume a higher quality service in the private sector. Redistribution does occur, but in some cases it might involve a deadweight loss. Concretely, if the quality of the public good supplied is low, both low-income and highincome individuals may be worse off, as the poor effectively receive a public service, but they do not value it, whereas the rich pay taxes for nothing in return (as they use private solutions).
The Dominican Republic seems to have fallen in one of these inefficient equilibriums for political economy reasons: it is too costly to create both the political and the civil society coalitions that would lead to achieve greater government accountability and an improvement in public services. As we will see in the next section, citizens´ trust in institutions is low and those who can afford it have already decided to respond individually to the problems. In this section we introduce some examples of sectors or activities in which the middle and high classes in the Dominican Republic have opted for private solutions to substitute or complement poor public service provision.
II.1 Electricity supply
The Electric sector in the Dominican Republic has been characterized by large energy losses caused by deficient infrastructures and maintenance, poorly targeted subsidies and widespread no-payment of bills. Reforms have proven to be slow and not always successful: for instance, the privatization process of the distribution companies had to be partially reversed, as mentioned inefficiencies resulted in persistent loses for private operators (see Reinstein and Cayo, 2010) .
New investments in infrastructure at the beginning of the decade motivated an increase in effective generation capacity of 43% and helped to partly reduce blackouts and distribution 1 See Annex II for a brief review of the different definitions of middle class and their use in the Dominican case.
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losses. However, despite installed capacity nowadays (around 3,000 MW) widely exceeds demand, high generation costs and inefficiency results in "financial blackouts", where the operators count with generation capacity but often face liquidity problems.
The quality of the service is poor, affected from technical and financial problems at the sector level. According to World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2010), surveyed companies suffer an average of 25.6 electrical outages a month (more than one blackout per working day), compared to just 3.9 percent on the average Latin American country. Moreover, 63% of the Dominican firms see electricity as a major constraint affecting daily operations (compared to 36.2% in Latin America). For this reason, some of the larger users (companies) have decided to leave the system and install their own generation equipment (10.9% compared to 4.2% in the region), resulting in a reduction in the number of customers and leading to a vicious cycle of worsening financial results at the distributor´s level.
This vicious cycle is affecting not only the final consumer (industries, citizens…), but also public finances and government´s ability to conduct a wide range of economic policies. The state is covering the gap between international oil price fluctuations and national oil price changes (artificially mitigated) and also losses in distribution and generation companies derived from several inefficiencies (technical losses, widespread invoice non-payment, etc.).
International organizations are pushing to reduce subsidies and clear arrears to the private generators. However, reforms continue to advance slowly and subsidies accounted for approximately 1.2% of GDP in 2010, against an initial target of 0.8%.
[6] In the same way some factories have chosen to privately generate electricity in order to avoid sudden production stops, households cannot fully rely on this faulty system either. Since electricity blackouts are frequent in the Dominican Republic, buildings increasingly count with alternative electricity supply systems. The so-called "inversores" (electrical inverter) are used to supply energy stored in batteries (direct current) to alternating current. They are the cheapest and less sophisticated private solution to electricity shortfalls in the country. On the other hand, "generadores" (generators, normally using fuel-oil) are normally found in newer and more expensive blocks of flats and houses.
Given this context, it would be interesting to calculate auto generation capacity installed by private hands (both companies and families) and also expenditure on auto generation, which can illustrate the substitution of public goods.
In 2001, a survey conducted under the supervision of the National Commission for Energy concluded that auto generation capacity (2,715 MW at the time) was already similar to installed power in the national interconnected system (see BID, 2010 upper middle class 6 is significantly more covered against public sector inefficiency in the field of power supply, which could theoretically hamper they demand for improvement in the sector.
In sum, this example illustrates how the Dominican middle and high class has internalized the costs derived from both state and market failures in the provision of public goods. In this case, the existence of private auto generation capacity of electricity, together with widespread non-payment and fraud, results in persistent low quality of service. As we will argue in the next section, weak collective action and limited public accountability mechanisms are influenced by this poor service provision.
II.2 Education
The education system in the Dominican Republic is characterized by high repetition rates and low completion. According to ECLAC (2010), the late completion rate for children aged 9-11 years in the Dominican Republic is 20%, among the highest in the region, compared to 3% in Mexico or 10% in Brazil. On the quality side, the performance of students in primary education (3 rd and 6 th grade) on regional math and reading tests was very poor, a strong signal of remaining challenges in service delivery. According to UNDP (2010) , impoverishment in the quality of public education together with the lack of sufficient classrooms motivates attendance to private schools. Similarly, countries with less degree of public expenditure in education are expected to present higher enrollment rates in private schools. As shown in the graph, the Dominican Republic has presented over the last decade the lowest level of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Latin America, and it is a country with a relatively high rate of enrollment in private secondary schools.
6 The average monthly income of individuals belonging to Q5 households is of just US$350, it is likely that the survey is not capturing the real picture of Dominican elites.
[11] Apart from budget/input indicators, the Dominican Republic seems to have fallen behind also when we look at other dimensions of the education system. Gross primary (104%) and secondary (75%) enrolment were below the regional averages (116% and 89% respectively) in 2008. Adopting a socioeconomic approach, the middle and high classes are characterized for enjoying higher formation than the lower strata; even if it would be necessary to control for specific factors, this observation probably highlights inequalities and barriers in the access and completion of secondary and superior education for those with limited resources. (modern facilities and less crowded classrooms), but not better education, as teachers in the 75% of private centers do not attain the average standards in formation and professionalism (UNDP, 2010). Interestingly, nowadays the share of children in quintile 2 attending to private schools is lower than that of the lowest quintile. A possible explanation is that a portion of the poorest is settled in areas where public schools are overcrowded or access is limited. The proportion of children going to private centers in quintile 5 is significantly higher than among the rest of the population, suggesting the idea of education for elites that can afford it. However, differences in opting out behavior between quintiles 1 and 4 are not pronounced, and when conducting logit regression, contrary to the electricity case, all the quintile dummies are significant. As it will be discussed, this suggests a different pattern in opting out behavior in the case of education, where differences across socioeconomic classes are less pronounced (except for the richest), than in the cases of electricity or health services.
In sum, again, the education sector in the DR presents faulty public service delivery, which originates a private offer that is more of a reactive upshot to deficiencies in state education than a high quality alternative (at least not in every case). The result is an inefficient equilibrium were people is not satisfied with public education either when they use it and do not spend much on it (usually the poorer) or when they choose private schools but they are still paying for public education in the form of taxes (the middle and upper classes).
II.3 Health
In In the last decade there have been important improvements in access to the health system, but the quality of public services is still insufficient in some areas. For example, the maternal mortality rate has remained stuck at the 100/100,000 live births 10 level since 2005. By looking at the graph, it can be observed that, even when the DR is not one of the underperformers above the regression line, infant mortality rates are still significantly high (32 per 1000) and above regional averages (22 per 1000).
The DR ranks at the bottom of LAC region in what regards public expenditure on health, averaging 1.40 percent of GDP in 2000-07. The result is that the state is just financing around 36% of total spending, whereas individual "out of pocket" expenditure amounts 56% and private insurances just cover 8%. "Out of pocket" expenditure is clearly regressive, as the poorer households have to devote a larger share of income in relative terms, thus posing an important challenge for development.
The middle and upper strata of the Dominican population, in terms of income, usually have access to the public health system through the contributory regime, when they are employed. However, given the high levels of informality of the Dominican economy, there is a large share of the working population that has either to opt for the partially subsidized regime, or to recur to private insurances. Moreover, imperfections in the public system, together with a lack of incentives to improve quality standards causes that some of the people in the lower strata prefer to get treatment in private hospitals. As expected, the strata of the population with a higher income are more inclined to attend to private hospitals and clinics when they feel the need. It is somehow surprising to see that 12.8 % of the population of the poorest quintile declared to have gone to a private clinic or hospital when ENDESA survey was conducted (2007) . This probably reflects that the fully subsidized national insurance regime still presents wide gaps in coverage that force the poorest to recur in some cases to private clinics and make burdensome disbursements to get treated.
Figure 11: Form of payment of the medical check up
By looking at the form of payment of the medical check up, it is possible to observe that population in quintiles 3 and 4 (intermediate strata) are the most propense to totally assume health-care related expenditures, as often they are neither covered by the national insurance (if they work informally) nor enrolled in private insurances. Payments for medicines and for laboratory analysis are a burden for the Dominicans; 66% of the population interviewed in ENDESA was wholly affording their medication, with few variation across income quintiles.
Again, this is a barrier in the health system with regressive implications.
ENDESA survey also offer estimations of average expenditure per capita in health checkups during the month preceeding the survey. This may be a good estimate of "out of pocket" spending, since it covers money paid for doctor check up, medicines, and laboratory analysis and it does not consider expenditure related to prolongued/chronical diseases, surgery and prolonged treatment ("internamientos"). Figure 12: Average expenditure in medical consultation on the month before the survey, by type of centre
As it is shown in the graph, people from the first quintile 11 is spending an average of RD$ 896 (US$ 23) when they go to a SESPAS public center for examination. This confirms that there is a share of the poorest population that is not totally covered by the fully-subsidized regime.
The main implication is that those that have to attend to the doctor may be spending most of its monthly income in health services, even when they use the public system (the upper income boundary for this quintile is RD$ 1,904 a month).
People from the middle and higher strata (Q4 and Q5) are on average paying 68% more than people in the lower quintiles (Q1-3) when they opt for a public centre for a check up 12 .
One of the reasons for this divergence may be that the richer strata of the population are not subsidized, which affects averages, or that they "consume" more medicines and are more able and willing to pay for additional analysis and medical check-ups in order to obtain a better diagnosis. In any case, the narrower difference in cost the upper intermediate class (Q4) is facing when they are choosing between public or private health is likely to be one of the reasons why they are more propense to opt for private services, especially when some public centres often lack of good reputation. level of affiliation to private health insurances, and they are the only significant quintile dummies when a logit regression is applied to test opting for private health insurances across quintiles. As can be seen in the graph, differences across quintiles in private health affiliation are much wider that in the case of private education.
We also include a dummy for informal workers; against the intuition, formal workers show more inclination to sign up in private health insurances than informal ones. It seems that informality levels are lower among middle and high class employees, groups that usually have the purchase power to acquire private insurances, and they prefer to do so, since public services have relatively low quality standards.
To sum up, the Dominican Republic Social Insurance System is still recent and the ambitious set of reforms reforms aimed at expanding its coverage and improving its quality has not been fully implemented yet. Additionally, it can be argued that the system is "fragmented" between people in the contributory and subsidized regimes. These are some of the reasons why the upper intermediate strata of the Dominican population seems to be motivated to individualize and internalize the cost of health services by opting for private centres. In conclusion, by studying public electricity supply, education and health in the Dominican Republic, it is possible to observe two common patterns: poor quality of service delivery and adoption of private alternatives by the middle and upper classes. Concretely, in the case of electricity supply and healthcare, quintiles 4 and 5 show statistically significantly more propensity to opt for private solutions than the rest of the population. In the case of education, there does not seem to be such dissimilar behavior across income quintiles, as there is still a relatively large share of the intermediate strata (Q3 and Q4) attending to public centres.
In the following section we argue that the observed individualization of solutions and the choice of private alternatives among the middle classes further weakens the incentives for collective action demanding greater state accountability. This is one of the reasons why improvements in public sector delivery are slowly implemented.
[21]
III Low institutional trust and weak collective action in the Dominican Republic
It is the purpose of this section to provide some explanations of the causes for the observed low quality of public goods in the Dominican Republic. We do it by looking at collective action, institutional trust and the abovementioned individualization of public goods in the Dominican Republic.
According to Gordon Marshall, collective action is the "action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members' perceived shared interests." The logic behind collective action is that citizens can come together to demand and sustain reforms that produce a perceived greater good for society. However, some sectors of society are not always able or willing to actively participate in collective action. Olson (1965) argued that individuals pursue the interest of the group they belong to, and they tend to "free ride" when demanding collective goods (for the whole population).
Additionally, in the developing world, the nature of collective action and participation in democracy may be further distorted by restrictions embedded in the political system. North citizens have voice to demand over politicians and client power to exercise over service providers; the state can respond by re-organizing departments, altering the budget or modifying the rules applied by service provides (compact); providers can also respond to client power by managing their frontlines. The consequence of having obstacles in any of these channels or in the capacity of the actors is often poor service delivery.
Applying the implications of the abovementioned Limited Access Order model to the public service delivery framework presented in WDR 2004, it is possible to understand some of the obstacles for state accountability and efficiency LAO (usually developing) countries present.
First, in developing nations, the "short route" of accountability directly liking clients and providers is often missing, and the state is involved (filtering) communication between both
groups of actors. Secondly, some interest groups within the state may be resistant to enforce demanded reforms (from which they would be worse-off), thus debilitating the exercise of compact over providers. Thirdly, weak collective action may hamper citizen voice for improvement in the quality of public services. As it can be observed, these definitions do not exactly correspond with the concept of collective action stated above, nor with our idea -for the purposes of this paper-of collective action as [23] "an organized demand for enhanced services and government accountability". , 2008) . On the other hand, however, just 15% of the Dominicans think that the government acts on behalf of the whole population and general welfare 14 , the lowest value in the region. Moreover, citizens have a high perception of corruption (see Seligson and Smith 2010:72) and they consider that the quality of public services is poor. Only 28% of the population believes that public policies improve living conditions. Confidence in different institutional bodies of the DR is, at best, intermediate if we compare to the regional average, with the army and the central government recording the lowest levels of trust. Therefore, it seems that civic engagement is not translated into effective coalition building for reforms and improvement in the DR welfare state, which in turn provokes low levels of institutional trust. There is also evidence that those that enjoy a better economic situation are less likely to seek assistance from the local government. Instead, as illustrated in the previous section, they usually opt for individual solutions to complement insufficient infrastructures (in health, education, power supply…).
The perception of lack of citizen demands is well illustrated by the following newspaper joke, referring to recent citizen movements in Spain, and claiming that in the Dominican Republic there are not protesters: 15 In the literature there is not strong evidence of the expected positive relation between civic engagement (and collective action) and institutional trust (Espinal et al., 2006; Finkel et al., 2000) . Conversely, here we will try to see if the low levels of institutional trust may burden collective action (see, for instance Levi and Stoker, 2000) . Overall, it is possible to affirm that, even if the Dominican Republic presents high levels of civic engagement and participation, the intensity of its demands if weak. A plausible explanation for this puzzle (high participation -low intensity of demands/collective action) is that participation in different civil organizations (municipal, religious or other associations) has very diverse motivations, whereas collective and coordinated demand for state accountability is undermined by low trust in public institutions (and also in the effectiveness of collective demand) and by the fact that a large share of the middle class has already individually solved its
problems (in what regards education, health or electricity, for instance). Thus, it can be argued that the low levels of public expenditures allocated to health and education, frequent electrical blackouts, shortage of qualified human capital, high maternal mortality rate or low levels of accountability and transparency are the results of both state disengagement and the weak capacity and incentives for civil society to collectively demand.
The middle and richer classes have reacted by internalizing the costs of state absenteeism, relying on private sector for basic services delivery, with an increase of vertical and horizontal inequalities to follow; on the other hand, the government has relied more on upward accountability systems and party politics than on building constituencies. In such a context, government incentives to pursue interactions with citizens do not currently exist, and citizens' incentives to engage with the government are undermined by low trust in government institutions and performance (Espinal and Morgan, 2008) . This vicious cycle is reinforced since, [27] at (Ferroni et al, 2008 ).
the same time <<weak spending institutions and low quality services […] spawn dissatisfaction and may underpin[…] low level of trust in public institutions>>

An exception: Collective action in the 4% movement for education
Even when the Dominican civil society is characterized by low-intensity activity motivated by the fragmented or dissimilar interests among organizations and socioeconomic classes, a couple of exceptional examples of collective action from the past two years show that wide and coordinated demands for accountability do happen when there are aligned incentives across groups.
In 2009 there were organized protests against the settlement of a cement production plant in the proximity of the national park of "Los Haitises". Collective action in this case helped to increase the political cost of going ahead with the construction of the facility, resulting in the government asking an independent UNDP team for assessment in the decision. Experts declared that the project could be damaging for the environment, so construction was finally stopped. In this case, the pressure exerted by the public opinion compelled the government to adopt an enhanced transparency mechanism, by looking for an independent actor to judge on the environmental impact of the project.
In December 2010, DR citizenry massively hit the streets in different parts of the country in order to demand the implementation of General Education Law (66-97), stating that public expenditure allocated to education has to be of 4% of GDP. These demonstrations is an exception to the low level of engagement in public protest that has been documented in the Dominican Republic, as well as to our contention that the upper-intermediate strata of the population are less active in demanding enhanced public accountability and the improvement of social services. This movement was originally built upon net social networks and the use of mobile phones, including middle class citizens actively involved in the protests to demand an a public education of better quality, even when a share of their children are attending private schools. According to civil society specialists, one of the main features of the "4% movement" is its heterogeneous composition, as it is integrated by groups ranging from youth civic associations with no defined political sign (Toy Jarto) to religious movements (Juan XXIII). What are the reasons for such a wide set of communities engaging together in this occasion, when they do not usually joint efforts to pursue other demands? In this case, there is an obvious lack of quality of the public service, recognized at every level of society, in confluence with the existence of a law quantifying a "desired" level of input for a public service. Thus, both groups protesting to enhance the quality of education and groups in demand of compliance with the [28] law and enhancing transparency are aligned to demand the 4%. It is also worth noting that, as it has been pointed out in the previous section, individualization behavior in education (opting for private schools) is less pronounced and shows less divergences between income quintiles 1 and 4 than in the case of electricity supply or health insurances. This may have been one of the reasons why there has been broad consensus in the Dominican society to collective demand for improvement in the field of education.
What has been government's response to the "4% movement"? Initially reluctant, President Fernandez publicly discredited 4% demands and qualified existing law as unrealistic and unattainable in the medium term. Nevertheless, contrary to public speech defending education policies under the current administration, the President has finally replaced the minister of education, it has also committed not to reduce spending in education, health and social protection, despite public administration budget cuts of 12% in 2011, and has reflected in the law project of the new tax reform that approved measures are aimed at eventually attaining the 4% of GDP allocated to education. Thus, the government is showing increasing preoccupation and interest on this issue and has already started taking policy actions to meet public demands. Whether the concrete 4% demand is eventually met or not, this case shows that collective action in society is one of the channels to enhance public accountability, increase citizen ownership in politics and, ultimately, achieve improved public services provision in LAO developing countries.
[29]
IV Policy recommendations
How can the Dominican Republic enhance public accountability and improve the quality of services, in order to restore the broken link between the citizens and the state? Three main policy actions are drawn from analysis: It is worth mentioning that, even if the scope of this paper is limited, discussed policy actions are likely to apply to most of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, since problems described in this analysis on the DR are similar to those highlighted by other regional studies. Both Ferroni et al (2008) and the OECD (2010) refer to the vicious cycle presented above, even when they focus more in dismal state revenues (lack of inputs for enhancing the quality of public services) than in individualization of public goods, lack of institutional trust and weak collective action as the main explanatory cause. Ferroni et al (2008) suggests the need to 16 IPAC is a coalition building initiative original from the Dominican Republic in which civil society organizations, different government bodies and up to twelve international donors (USAID, AECID, the World Bank, the European Union, etc.) exchange views and agree actions aimed at improving government accountability and transparency in a wide range of fields, from public contracts and acquisitions to financial management, health, education or energy. We refer to upcoming analytical work on the IPAC initiative for a deeper understanding of this public accountability mechanism.
invest in human capital and also to enhance tax collection mechanisms by increasing direct taxes if necessary and reassessing the redistributive effects of the system (government driven).
OECD (2010) is more inclined towards improving tax administration, transparency and institutional image prior to addressing tax reforms (state driven). In this paper we have proposed a third way which encompasses enhancing communication and accountability mechanisms between the state and the citizenry (civil society or middle class driven).
V Conclusion
In conclusion, in the Dominican Republic, public sector services in the areas of electricity supply, education and health present deficiencies persisting over time. If the quality of education, health or public transportation is low, the middle class is likely to opt for private services. At the same time, it would prefer to contribute less to the financing of public expenditure.
<<*…+ if education, health care and other public services lack quality, the medium class population will be more likely to consider themselves losers from a fiscal point of view, which will make them less inclined to finance the public sector>>.
OECD (2010) The paper has described how the middle class in the Dominican Republic is adopting private solutions instead of using collective goods. This trend, combined with low levels of institutional trust, results in low engagement in collective action for demand, leading to malfunctioning accountability and enforcement mechanisms between service delivery suppliers and beneficiaries. The main outcome is a vicious circle where it is too costly to create both the political and the civil society coalitions that would lead to achieve greater government accountability and improvement in service provision.
At the same time, collective demands for the 4% of GDP in education show that this perverse dynamic can be changed in certain cases, as the citizenry can exert some pressure on the executive, thus enhancing public accountability and ultimately achieving better quality services. This has been possible in a context less differences in the levels of opting out for private schools between the poorer and the middle class, compared to the wider gaps observed in the adoption of private solutions in the electricity sector and the health sector.
One of the main caveats of this paper is that we have not been able to test whether there are differences in civil participation and political activism across socioeconomic classes or income quintiles, due to lack of reliable income variables in opinion surveys. Still, we believe that the discussion embedded in this country case may be an interesting starting point for a [31] deeper analysis on the individualization of public goods by the middle class in LAC. We argue that enhancing transparency and accountability in public sector service delivery, building capacity at the civil society and aligning the interests of the poorer and middle classes are some of the ways that could help the DR and other countries in Latin America to get out of this sub-optimal equilibrium and provide citizens with efficient and improved public services.
Annex I. The middle class in Latin America and the DR
In this section we briefly review some of the definitions of middle class given in the literature. While most of them are useful for establishing cross-country comparisons, the selection criterion of its boundaries is to some extent discretionary and, when applied to the DR, they do not often suit the middle class idea we have in mind. This is the reason why, for simplicity purposes, we adopt the socioeconomic classification included in ENIGH 2007 national household survey, elaborated by the National Office for Statistics of the Dominican Republic.
The studies on the middle class are motivated by the alleged benefits this group of population is supposed to bring to economic growth and the welfare state. To count with a strong middle class is believed to help a country to support economic development (see Easterly, 2001) , as well as to indirectly contribute to build democracy and social policies aimed at achieving more inclusive growth through the formation of optimal alliances supporting an enhanced redistribution of income and/or enhanced institutions.
But how is the middle class defined 17 ? Do these theoretical considerations apply for
Latin American countries and, more concretely, to the Dominican Republic? In this section we do not pretend to take part in the middle class debate, but just to select a few definitions and see how they fit in the case of the Dominican Republic.
Within income-based measures, a first approach uses absolute thresholds. Martin
Ravaillon ( measure that results from adding income per capita earned in deciles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and dividing it by total income perceived by the population. According to this index, the DR ranked 8
17 The concept of "Middle Class" has been subject of debate for decades. There are two main strands of literature: on the one hand, a sociological perspective that originally draws from the views of Marx (property of the means of production) and Weber (common identity, status and way of life), departing from a complex set of common features to identify a class; on the other hand, an economic perspective, which mainly uses income as the tool to stratify population, this way facilitating the study of other socioeconomic characteristics. 18 Data retrieved using PovcalNet. shows the mentioned vulnerability of the middle class in the DR (against that of the richer strata, which did not show any variation). According to this criterion, the "intermediate strata"
has enlarged again to represent nowadays 44% of the population Finally, we refer to the National Office for Statistics of the DR (ONE), who constructed a "Socio Economic Group" variable in its ENIGH 2007 survey that considers not only the income dimension but also possession of certain goods, the education level or the ownership of a 21 US$100 a month is below the minimum salary officially established in the DR. At this point, it is worth noting that these are per capita income figures that result from dividing income between total members. Thus, a household head may be the only person employed in the family, gaining 20,000 DR pesos a month (around US$ 540), which divided into the spouse and two children results in just 5,000 pesos per capita; however, the different family members are not expected to consume in the same proportion. Moreover the analysis of distribution derived from the DR National Labour Force survey only considers income from the main activity, and not total household income (as it excludes income from a second occupation, national transfers, remittances and other rents from financial and non financial assets).
house.
Population is classified according to five socio economic group categories: the poor, around 10% of the population below the extreme poverty level; the lower class represents around 47% of the population, lives at subsistence level and consumes mostly basic foods, earning an average of RD$4,891 in terms of primary occupation income 22 ; around 20% of the population belongs to the middle class, characterized for affording imported food products and earning an average of RD$6,214 a month; the upper middle class is about 17% of the population and has an income level that makes expenditures on food products a relatively less significant portion of their overall income (average labor income per capita of RD$ 8,906); finally, the upper class is composed by conspicuous consumers for which almost any product or service is accessible (average labor income per capita of RD$18, 545) . It is worth noting that, according to the ENFT survey, the median income from the primary activity is similar to that of ENIGH (around RD$6600).
In sum, as we argue, there is no consensus definition, and the wide variety of incomebased measures, when applied to the DR, result in very uneven estimations of the "intermediate strata". Still, one of the main outcomes common to these measurements is that the focus in the "intermediate strata" defined according to the income standards in the Dominican Republic (and in Latin America) implies to consider groups of population that are economically vulnerable.
In this paper we do not intend to offer a new criterion to try to determine the size of the middle class in the DR, but rather just to illustrate some of its behavioral patterns, such as an observed tendency to adopt individual solutions to solve collective problems.
22 Where most of the studies mentioned in this section draw from household income per capita figures, here we depart from income data declared by the head of household. This choice obviously has some limitations: for the same income level, larger families will have more expenses, which results in that an individual included in Q3 can be relatively poorer that one in Q2 without dependents. On the other hand, using individual income data it is possible to obtain a more accurate picture of the salary dimension and its relation with, for instance, minimum salary in the country or the level of education.
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Annex II. Calculation of auto generation capacity figures or semi-diesel engines): between 75kVA and 375kVA 85 02 13 Generating sets with compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines): exceeding 375 kVA 85 02 20 Generating sets with spark-ignition internal combustion piston engines Second, we assign a "standard" power generation capacity value for each of the product groups, always considering given range (e.g. 75 kVA -375 kVA). Then, we calculate total "imported" generation capacity by multiplying the number of generators (customs data) by the "standard" generation capacity for each model. Customs data on imports do not allow us to distinguish between generators that will be integrated into the national grid ("public" 23 ), and those that will constitute complementary generation capacity that will be privately used (both by households and industries) to respond to blackouts in the national system. Therefore, it is necessary to subtract the increase in installed capacity on the national grid from yearly generators imports, in order to approximately infer private power generation capacity building.
The result of this rough estimation is that, from 2001 onwards, approximately 688 MW have been privately installed to complement the national grid when a blackout occurs. This means that alternative auto generation capacity installed by private actors may be already superior that generation capacity at the national network.
As it can be observed in the following graph, deterioration in the public utility service in 2003 and 2004 (following economic crisis) caused an upsurge in imports of for private auto generation, a trend that seems to be confirmed by sector experts.
23 Here "public" refers to electricity generation power for public use (to feed the national electricity grid), even if it has been generated by private or semi-private companies.
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Figure 20: Evolution of installed electric generation capacity in the Dominican Republic At this point, it is worth noticing that we are aware of the limitations posed by inferring these private capacity and consumption figures departing from customs data and household surveys, since the series of assumptions needed to provide an estimation (even when it is very rough) enlarge the margin of error. Regardless of whether estimations are more or less accurate, it is our aim to at least highlight the investment effort that private households and companies are undertaking to offset failures in the provision of a utility such as electricity supply, since it has led to the creation of an "auxiliary" or alternative system to the national grid, which is likely to be economically inefficient. Cumulative imported capacity (customs estimations)
